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The topic of human suffering loomed large throughout the writings of Zygmunt Bauman. If anything, his work 
can be characterized as a ‘sociology of suffering’. From the early writings until his very last, suffering constituted 
a key concern in Bauman’s description of the transformation of society from a solid-modern to a liquid-modern 
outlook. In his work, there are certain shifts in who and what he regards as the embodiments or expressions of 
suffering, and there is thus a keen eye on the changing landscape of suffering, its causes and consequences, from 
past to present. But there is nevertheless always a continuous and vehement defence for those living at the outskirts 
or at the bottom of society. The article will also explore what Bauman suggest should be done about the presence 
of suffering, and the article will briefly discuss the viability of his ideas on a morality of proximity as a way to 
alleviate suffering. 
 






Suffering makes the world go around. Although this may sound as an excessively gloomy and 
cynical observation, all societies throughout human history have produced and perpetuated hu-
man suffering either through elaborate and determined measures or through the neglect of those 
who in one way or other have fallen below the level of human decency and outside our realm 
of concern and care. Think of wars, famines, natural disasters, killings, ethnic cleansings, gen-
ocides, persecutions, stigmatizations, marginalization’s and so on. The outcome has always 
been human suffering in some shape or form. Suffering is thus an integral part of the human 
condition – in the past as well as in the present. Some of the causes of this suffering are beyond 
human control or stem from non-human forces, whereas other causes are the direct or indirect 
outcome of human action or social forces. 
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The theme of suffering has always attracted the attention of thinkers, poets, politicians 
and social commentators. From theologians and moral philosophers to psychologists and soci-
ologists, suffering has constituted a recurrent topic in the analysis of human and social life. One 
of the most prominent contemporary observers of the human condition was Polish-English so-
ciologist Zygmunt Bauman. For more than half a century, he practiced the discipline and heeded 
the calling of sociology. Throughout the years, he has at an almost inhuman pace published 
numerous pieces of work that have left a lasting and indelible imprint on future studies of a 
variety of sociological topics such as, most prominently, the Holocaust, morality, postmoder-
nity, utopia, culture, the intellectuals, critical sociology, liquid modernity, globalization, iden-
tity, fear, inequality, ethics, education, community, love, individualization, education, freedom, 
consumerism, surveillance, religion, nostalgia, etc. In his writing, Bauman regarded the practice 
of sociology as a hermeneutic enterprise in which the sociologist in the role of ‘interpreter’ 
should decipher the unfolding of human life and translate and mediate this knowledge back to 
society, thus allowing the members of society to act on this new knowledge (Bauman, 1978, 
1987). In his own words, sociology is an ‘ongoing conversation with human experience’ (Bau-
man, 1992:213), and it is this human life experience that has continued to animate and to con-
stitute the core of his curiosity. There is, however, also an unmistakable critical dimension to 
Bauman’s interpretative work – a gnawing dissatisfaction with the way the world is currently 
working, a relentless critique of the seemingly unchangeable character of the way life is lived 
and a valiant defence of the possibility of creating a better world (Bauman, 1976a, 1976b). 
Throughout his comprehensive body of work, Bauman set out to criticize the perpetuation and 
continuation of suffering in all its shapes and forms no matter what specific topic he was writing 
on, and in this way he may meaningfully be characterized as a ‘sociologist of suffering’ par 
excellence. 
In this article, we shall revisit and review the work of Zygmunt Bauman in order to exca-
vate some of his main ideas on suffering or what will here be framed under the notion of ‘social 
suffering’. In all of Bauman’s books – no matter their specific topic – suffering has always been 
a prevalent concern whether explicitly stated or more implicitly hidden between the lines. First, 
we shall look into how we may understand social suffering as a human and social emotion. 
Following this, we will dig into Bauman’s oeuvre in order to detect the changing role of suffer-
ing has played in his writings. This leads us into a delineation of how suffering according to 
Bauman is experienced during solid-modern times in the shape of, for example, totalitarianism 
and genocide. before we turn to how social suffering in his view is experienced and expressed 
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during liquid-modern times. This leads to the final section in which we will present and discuss 
of Bauman’s suggestions for how suffering may be alleviated. 
 
Suffering as emotion 
Suffering is an integral part of our being-in-the world. Very few people pass through life with-
out experiencing suffering at some point or other. In this way, suffering is something most can 
relate to. Still, however, it is difficult to define suffering in a simple one-liner, the reason being 
that suffering is a multi-facetted phenomenon. Fundamentally, suffering is the experience of 
undergoing pain or hardship, whether physiological, psychological or otherwise, and whether 
directly felt or derived from other types of experience. It is often – however not exclusively – 
the outcome of externally imposed or inflicted harm, resulting in inner feelings of pain, depri-
vation or distress. Due to its multi-facetted nature, suffering can be studied from many different 
perspectives, each with their own specialized vernacular and frames of understanding: medi-
cine, theology, psychology, sociology and so on. Often scientific studies of suffering differen-
tiate between physical suffering (frequently described as ‘pain’) on the one hand, and suffering 
as a social experience connected to structural, cultural or relational aspects of life, on the other 
(sometimes called ‘social suffering’). Whereas ‘pain’ often evokes a physical imagery of harm 
inflicted directly on the human body, suffering as a social experience is much more of an un-
definable and slippery phenomenon, difficult do describe by reference to bodily pain. Suffering 
can thus be concrete (like the pain associated, for example, with physical assault or somatic 
disease) or it can be less tangible and more abstract (such as, for example, the experience of 
Weltschmerz or the outcome of social deprivation).  
Ludwig Wittgenstein once insisted that ‘no torment can be greater than what a single 
human being may suffer … The whole planet can suffer no greater torment than a single soul’ 
(Wittgenstein cited in Bauman, 2001a:210). Despite its sympathetic message, the veracity or 
validity of this statement is obviously difficult to determine, as experiences of suffering are 
almost impossible to measure and compare. There is, however, no doubt that suffering is expe-
rienced both at the individual and at the collective level. Suffering is simultaneously a general-
ized and an individualized experience – something that happens to many people (sometimes at 
the same time and for the same reasons), but also something that afflicts actual and concrete 
individuals (and some more than others). The proportion of suffering in the world is thus not 
equally distributed, and like most other unequally distributed phenomena, those at the bottom 
of society often carry a heavier burden of suffering than those at the top (see, e.g., Bourdieu et 
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al., 1999). Suffering is thus not only an experience suffered by the individual in isolation, but 
something that affects larger groups of people (sometimes even cross-generationally), which is 
why it is an important topic for scholars working within a field such as sociology concerned as 
it is with ‘the social’. As already C. Wright Mills (1959) famously informed his readers, the 
‘sociological imagination’ consists of connecting what at the outset may seem to be merely 
private or individual experiences with the larger structural and social conditions under which 
they occur. 
Often suffering is regarded as the existential or phenomenological experience of being 
human in the world, something being born with us from the very beginning. In this way, suf-
fering is surrounded by some innocence – it is almost unavoidable – and thus to be human is to 
suffer. However, in recent years, there has been an increased concern with notions of ‘social 
harm’ and ‘social suffering’ (see, e.g., Pemberton, 2016; Wilkinson, 2004, 2005), both concepts 
stressing the social nature and causes of harm/suffering. ‘Social suffering’ can be defined as 
‘collective and individual human suffering associated with life conditions shaped by powerful 
social forces’. Moreover, according to Arthur Kleinman, Veena Das and Margaret Lock (1996: 
xi), social suffering ‘results from what political, economic and institutional power does to peo-
ple, and, reciprocally, how these forms of power themselves responses to social problems’. 
There is a dual-process involved here – that suffering is created or inflicted by institutions and 
agencies and that they again respond to how such suffering is to be managed. There thus seems 
to be a circular process in social suffering: that suffering is socially produced and then again 
socially reproduced by the way suffering is approached and handled. That suffering is ‘social’ 
also entails that suffering is not natural, and thus not something to be passively observed and 
accepted. Suffering can thus be countered, objected to, diminished and prevented if active en-
gagement with the roots of suffering is pursued (Jacobsen, 2020). This objective has also been 
a main motivational force behind many political and social movements throughout history. 
Suffering is therefore, in its many different shapes and forms, a social experience. Perhaps 
most importantly, suffering or social suffering is an emotional experience – it is an emotion. 
Suffering is something that people feel not just something they think – it influences the mind 
and body of the sufferer in a qualitatively different manner than other emotions. In recent years, 
the ‘sociology of emotions’ has risen to prominence as a sub-discipline devoted to the study of 
emotions within different social contexts (see, e.g., Bericat, 2016). However, suffering has often 
been neglected as an emotion deserving of attention within this line of research, perhaps being 
regarded as too intangible and philosophically abstract to investigate. Looking through most 
encyclopaedias or handbooks of ‘the sociology of emotions’, suffering is hardly ever mentioned 
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and there is no separate entry devoted to a definition of suffering as an emotion. This is quite 
surprising, because suffering is – after all – an emotion alongside so many other emotions stud-
ied by sociologists such as trust, loyalty, shame, pride, embarrassment, love, hate, contempt, 
remorse and so on. Yet suffering is still conspicuous by its absence. But why is this the case? 
There are many possible reasons, but perhaps the most obvious is simply that suffering is mostly 
not regarded as ‘an emotion’ or ‘a feeling’. It seems more abstract than these other emotions 
and true, it does lack several of the characteristics of an ‘emotion’ as specified by Arlie R. 
Hochschild (1990). Despite this, there is little doubt the suffering is indeed something that peo-
ple feel. Contrary to many other emotions – in emotions research particularly the so-called ‘pri-
mary emotions’ such as fear, happiness, sadness or anger– suffering does not have a definitive 
physiological reaction or bodily expression. It may thus be difficult to see or document that 
people in fact suffer, because many suffer invisibly and in silence. Suffering may be seen or 
unseen, excruciatingly painful or less so, lasting or fleeting, and so on. Social suffering is the 
often invisible emotional response to inhumane and indecent treatment of humans against each 
other. Sometimes there is no identifiable instigator or perpetrator of suffering (structural forces 
and symbolic violence are widely known to be difficult to observe directly), but at other times 
specific groups or individuals are responsible for inflicting pain and suffering. 
 
A world of suffering 
Zygmunt Bauman is conventionally not regarded as an obvious contributor to the particular 
sub-discipline of ‘the sociology of emotions’, although his work does in fact contain frequent 
references to and analyses of a number of emotions such as love, fear, freedom, nostalgia, am-
bivalence and suffering. The interesting thing about Bauman’s work is that he seems to treat 
emotions in a rather unemotional manner. By this is meant that he does not dig deep into how 
it actually feels for people to experience their emotions, but he rather sees these emotions as 
something being socially produced and reproduced (and not least distorted) through various 
processes and by different agencies (Jacobsen, 2019). Bauman is thus not an archetypal sociol-
ogist of emotions, he is more a general social theorist, and he thus not so much presents a 
phenomenology of suffering, explicating and detailing what suffering feels like, but more of a 
critical perspective on the structural causes and human consequences of social suffering. 
Anyone who has read Bauman’s books will know that they ooze of suffering – suffering 
has been there from the beginning to the end. Hence, it is unsurprising that there has been a 
certain academic interest in Bauman’s perspective on suffering (see, e.g., Best, 2016; Jacobsen 
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and Marshman 2008; Wilkinson, 2007). His sociology can best be described as a critical and 
humanistic enterprise, always focusing on the relentless impact of social forces on human life, 
and asking his readers – mostly an academic audience – to accept their responsibility for making 
the causes and consequences of suffering known to the world (Tester, 2004). As Dennis Smith 
once observed: ‘The driving force behind Zygmunt Bauman’s work as a sociologist has been 
two things: first, a sense of intellectual and moral outrage about the extent to which societies 
are run on the basis of untruth and self-deception; and, second, a deep dissatisfaction with the 
evil and suffering this makes possible’ (Smith, 1998:40). 
Suffering thus remained one of the key topics running throughout Bauman’s extensive writings, 
often closely connected to a concern with understanding how culture changes and shapes expe-
riences of suffering. As Bauman once remarked in an interview when asked to look back upon 
his own previous contributions there ‘were actually two things with which I was concerned 
throughout my writings, throughout my academic career. One was the working class, standing 
for the downtrodden or the underdog, for suffering in general. For a long time there was a sign 
of identity between the two: the working class as the embodiment of suffering. That was one 
topic, and the other was culture… To understand how the visibility, tangibility and power of 
reality – and the conviction concerning the belief in reality – are being constructed: that is why 
I became interested in culture’ (Bauman, 1992:206). Suffering and culture thus constitute the 
core of Bauman’s body of work. Throughout his work, Bauman remained a champion of the 
weak, the poor, the marginalized and those who are treated inhumanely. His specific focus on 
suffering, however, changed over the years. In his books one will therefore find many different 
depictions of man’s inhumanity towards man whether as part of the class-based oppression in 
capitalist society, in the concentration camps of World War II or as part of contemporary ne-
oliberal politics (see, e.g. Bauman, 1982, 1989, 2011). Sometimes this suffering has an identi-
fiable social sender, at other times seemingly more anonymous and amorphous social forces 
seem to be at work such as globalization and individualization. There are thus many specific as 
well as general faces of suffering appearing throughout Bauman’s work: the working class in 
capitalist society, the Jews in concentration camps, strangers, refugees, the ‘underclass’, the 
‘new poor’ and ‘flawed consumers’ and all the ‘vagabonds’ and the human ‘waste’ of contem-
porary liquid-modern life (Jacobsen and Marshman, 2008). However, particularly the persis-
tence of economic poverty, social inequality and the inability to uphold a decent human life 
spurred his sociological and moral indignation (see, e.g., Bauman, 2011, 2013). He even de-
noted poverty the ‘meta-humiliation’ that in turn serves as a ‘trampoline’ for other humiliations 
and indignities in life (Bauman and Tester, 2001:154). Hence all of Bauman’s books ooze with 
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solidarity and sympathy for people caught and suspended in the webs of power, oppression, 
persecution, poverty and potential extermination. He thus claimed that we, in the last instance, 
can only judge the moral character of ‘society by the care it takes of its weakest members’ 
(Bauman, 1990:23). 
Like all other emotions, it is – at least in my view – pointless to try to quantify suffering. 
Suffering is for all practical intents and purposes a qualitative experience whose depths and 
dimensions – human and social – are complex, thus making them difficult to capture or measure 
through surveys or statistics (even though many within positivist or behaviourist paradigms 
attempt to do so). Even though some scholars have excelled in quantifying and measuring levels 
of, for example, happiness, fear or grief, it often seems unconvincing when ‘levels of happiness’ 
between different countries are compared or when ‘scales of fear’ are used to analyse the fluc-
tuating level of fear in individuals or societies. In Bauman’s writings suffering is primarily 
presented as a qualitative phenomenon – something that has depths, processes, directions, den-
sity, and the like. Moreover, his treatment of the topic of suffering is almost exclusively con-
ceptual and theoretical as he has not carried out empirical studies of suffering. In his work, we 
see the different faces of suffering through conceptual development, case stories from news 
reports and insights from existing research. Although Bauman cites reports for example from 
the WHO or OECD about the state of global poverty, the unequal distribution of the wealth of 
the world or the total number of refugees in the world (see, e.g., Bauman, 2004:78-79; 2013:6-
7; 2016:7), his descriptions of suffering are always, in one way or other, concerned with show-
ing how suffering is brought about by social conditions and how it has serious human conse-
quences. Some of the suffering analysed by Bauman is what might be called ‘spectacular suf-
fering’ such as ground-breaking historical events like the Holocaust with its millions of human 
casualties (Bauman, 1989). However, most of the suffering described by him is rather ‘silent 
suffering’ – the suffering that largely goes unnoticed and which does not attract headlines or 
changes historical consciousness or development. This is the kind of suffering experienced by 
individuals and groups in society unable to raise their voices, to demand assistance or crave 
relief. Let us look a bit more into this world of suffering described by Bauman. 
 
Solid-modern suffering 
Particularly throughout the 1980s, Bauman established himself as a staunch critic of modern 
society with what he regarded as its obsessive drive for order. In books such as Legislators and 
Interpreters (1987), Freedom (1988), Modernity and the Holocaust (1989) and Modernity and 
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Ambivalence (1991a), he provided an in-depth analysis of some of the (in)human consequences 
of the dark side of modernity. Although modernity and modern society is often associated with 
positive developments such as progress, liberation and rising levels of prosperity, Bauman – in 
a manner true to critical social theory – almost one-sidedly concentrates on the negative aspects 
of modern society (Carleheden, 2008). As he once observed: ‘Modernity was a long march to 
prison. It never arrived there (though in some places, like Stalin’s Russia, Hitler’s Germany, or 
Mao’s China, it came quite close), albeit not for lack of trying’ (Bauman, 1992:xvii). In Bau-
man’s work, modernity is thus depicted as a period in which order, reason, unfreedom and 
repression become ‘normalized’. Moreover, he also shows how modernity waged a war against 
difference, diversity and ambivalence in its quest for order (Bauman, 1991a), and that this ob-
sessive urge – pursued through a number of general strategies by Bauman sometimes called 
‘social engineering’ or ‘gardening’ – to force order on an innately unorderly world came with 
high human costs. 
It is in Bauman’s award-winning book Modernity and the Holocaust (1989) that this per-
spective was elaborated and exemplified with special reference to the persecution and genocide 
of the European Jews during World War II. Like many European Jews from assimilated families 
at that time, Bauman’s first wife Janina had experienced her Jewishness in the light of the Hol-
ocaust, and her memoirs Winter in the Morning deals with her teenage-years in the Warsaw 
ghetto and the uncertain and insecure periods of hiding from the Nazis. In 1944, while still in 
hiding and continually in fear for her life, Janina experienced something of an epiphany regard-
ing her sense of belonging: ‘I belong to the Jews. Not because I was born one or because I share 
their faith – I never have done. I belong to the Jews because I have suffered as one of them. It’s 
suffering that has made me Jewish. I belong to people who have been murdered or who are still 
struggling to escape death’ (Bauman, 1986:181). One might speculate that it was the reading of 
Janina’s experiences during the Holocaust that inspired Zygmunt to write Modernity and the 
Holocaust. He acknowledged the impact her book had upon his own thought: ‘Having read 
Janina’s book, I began to think just how much I did not know – or rather, did not think about 
properly. It dawned on me that I did not really understand what had happened in that ‘world 
which was not mine’’ (Bauman, 1989:vii). Janina survived the concentration camps, and Zyg-
munt himself had escaped the persecution of the Jews during the war as he was stationed as a 
Polish solider in Russia. But the experiences of the Jews still became an important prism for 
his critical analysis of the suffering caused by the industrialized and organized killing of mil-
lions of people. In Modernity and the Holocaust Bauman thus outlined the social processes 
making the Holocaust possible and also the social processes that made it possible to exempt 
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oneself from responsibility for the atrocities and suffering imposed on the Jews. The Holocaust 
was indeed an extreme (yet not entirely exceptional) example of socially imposed suffering 
(Langer, 1996), but it was nevertheless in many ways symptomatic (Bauman calls it a ‘by-
product’) of the way modern society sought to solve its problems with deviance, difference and 
ambivalence: to remove it from the face of the earth through dehumanization, stigmatization, 
incarceration or annihilation. Even though the fate of the Jews was only one extreme example 
of solid-modern suffering, it was caused by the same mechanisms and strategies also employed 
in less extreme situations and with less atrocious outcomes. 
In Bauman’s view, there are thus several driving forces behind the Holocaust and solid-
modern suffering, some of which can be boiled down to individual brutalism and sadism, ide-
ological indoctrination, blind obedience to authority and culturally constructed stereotypes of 
the victims. However, also other seemingly more ‘innocent’ social causes and processes were 
involved such as what he terms ‘adiaphorization’ – meaning the emptying of action of moral 
content. According to Bauman, adiaphorization exists as a three-legged phenomenon: (1) by 
the articulation of action into the hierarchy of command and execution thereby placing actors 
in an ‘agentic state’ (Stanley Milgram’s (1974) term) in which their actions, however horrific, 
are not evaluated according to standards of individual conscience or moral indignation; (2) by 
‘effacing the face’ of the victim, which consists of casting the objects of action into a position 
in which they are not regarded as worthy or deserving of moral considerations and thus evicting 
them from the class of beings for whom we should feel morally responsible; and (3) by destroy-
ing the object of action as a self and reducing it to a collection of separate parts or attributes 
whereby the total moral subjectivity of the individual or groups of individuals towards whom 
action is taken is utterly denounced and denied (see, e.g. Bauman, 1995:148-152). Obviously, 
solid modernity was not all about mass murder and human suffering, but Bauman’s point is that 
many important traits of modernity made the very scope, effectiveness and denial of these in-
humanities possible. 
Bauman concluded Modernity and the Holocaust with a critique of what he called ‘Durk-
sonianism’ (a neologism constructed by combing the surnames of Émile Durkheim and Talcott 
Parsons) and functionalist explanations of the social/societal grounds of moral behaviour claim-
ing that ‘society is the cure for the wolf in man’ (Beilharz, 2000:42), which – seen in the light 
of the Holocaust – were unable to explain the inhumane atrocities as well as those who refused 
to follow suit and instead helped the victims. Moreover, in the Appendix to the book Bauman 
outlined the contours of a postmodern theory or morality to which we shall return later. 
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At the threshold of the new millennium, Bauman published a book that would significantly 
define and shape the subsequent writings until his death in 2017. That book was Liquid Moder-
nity (2000a). The book – and the string of titles published in its slipstream – all used the meta-
phor of ‘liquid modernity’ to capture contemporary society. It was Bauman’s contention that 
the concept of ‘postmodernity’, which he had preferred throughout the 1990s, had now served 
its purpose by paving the way and clearing the ground for this new notion that signalled (to-
gether with its concomitant notion of ‘solid modernity’) how something substantial had hap-
pened to the world, which required a new vocabulary. Whereas ‘solid modernity’, as we saw 
above, was conceptualized as a time of nation states, heavy capitalism and an industrialization 
of genocide, ‘liquid modernity’ is rather a time marked by a dissolution of the solids of the past 
(states, collective identities, communities, relationships and so on), meaning that they are una-
ble to hold their shape for long. Moreover, it inaugurates a time when deregulation, marketiza-
tion, privatization and a separation of power and politics making the latter impotent in dealing 
with the problems faced by society (Bauman, 2007). This ‘liquidization’ process impacts all 
dimensions of society from the macro-global level to the most intimate aspects of human life. 
It also impacts the way suffering is experienced, expressed, distributed and managed. 
Whereas the suffering associated with solid-modern society according to Bauman was 
often the outcome of totalitarian tendencies inherent in modernity, in liquid-modern society 
suffering is much more dispersed, mediated and intangible. As he in the beginning of the new 
millennium stated on this transition from solid-modern to liquid-modern violence and the suf-
fering resulting from it: 
 
A century likely to go down in history as one of violence perpetrated 
by nation-states on its subjects has come to a close. Another violent 
century – this time a century of violence prompted by the progressive 
disablement of the nation-states by free-floating global powers – is 
likely to succeed it (Bauman, 2001a:219). 
 
This transition does not mean, however, that the suffering caused by totalitarianism, nationalism 
and state-sponsored violence (symbolic or actual) has disappeared, but it has increasingly been 
supplemented by a plethora of largely invisible social forces leading to new forms of suffering 
– some of which are difficult to detect and document, but they are nevertheless experienced as 
suffering. This is the suffering that is the outcome of large-scale social processes such as 
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individualization, marketization and globalization (and a concomitant retreat of state powers 
and a dismantling of the welfare state). In Bauman’s perspective, we therefore need to reorient 
the focus of sociological analysis towards these new roots and expressions of suffering and 
social injustice. Whereas Jürgen Habermas (1984) had famously suggested that we need to pay 
critical attention to the incessant colonization of the lifeworld by the system, Bauman instead 
proposes that we in liquid-modern times need to look carefully at how the public sphere is 
increasingly colonized by private interests: 
 
The task of critical theory has been reversed. That task used to be the 
defence of private autonomy from the advancing troops of the ‘public 
sphere’, smarting under the oppressive rule of the omnipotent imper-
sonal state and its many bureaucratic tentacles or their smaller-scale 
replicas. The task is now to defend the vanishing public realm, or rather 
to refurnish and repopulate the public space fast emptying ... It is no 
more true that the ‘public’ is set on colonizing the ‘private’. The oppo-
site is the case: it is the private that colonizes the public sphere  
(Bauman, 2000:39). 
 
Thus, according to Bauman the suffering experienced (and the violence in liquid-modern soci-
ety no longer primarily stems from bureaucratic or totalitarian repression or industrially orga-
nized mass murder but also – and perhaps more so than previously – from the pitfalls of a 
shrinking and increasingly militarized public sphere, from the pains associated with individu-
alization, from the failures of successful consumerism and from the relentless and uncontrolla-
ble forces of globalization creating ‘collateral damages’ on all levels of social life. 
Throughout his writings in the new millennium, Bauman thus identifies several engines 
of liquid-modern suffering and he labelled individualization and globalization the two ‘meta-
causes’ of suffering. The title of his book Globalization – The Human Consequences (1998a) 
almost says it all: there are winners but also losers of the globalization game. The winners are 
the ‘tourists’ who can enjoy all the freedoms and opportunities available to them and who are 
welcomed with open arms everywhere, whereas the ‘vagabonds’ are the losers who remain on 
the move out of need and who are welcomed nowhere (perhaps a fitting metaphor for many of 
the refugees and migrants). It is Bauman’s point that mobility – its causes and outcomes – is 
one of the greatest stratifying factors of contemporary society. Moreover, as Bauman described 
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in detail in The Individualized Society (2001a), in times of individualization one is increasingly 
individually responsible for one’s successes but also for one’s own suffering. There is no more 
salvation from society – the winners can pride themselves of their successes, whereas the losers 
will have to bear their failures in shameful solitude (Bauman, 2001a). As a consequence, pre-
viously popular notions of a ‘collective fate’ – of the working-class or the Jews – no longer 
make sense in the same way as they did a century ago (even though Bauman does recognize the 
increasingly utilized notion of the ‘precariat’). As Bauman asserted: ‘Present-day miseries are 
not synchronized; to each door catastrophe knocks selectively, on different days, at different 
hours … Our sufferings divide and isolate: our miseries set us apart, tearing up the delicate 
tissue of human solidarities’ (Bauman, 1999a:53-54). This does not mean, however, that ‘col-
lective fates’ have necessarily disappeared (just think of the many groups still persecuted col-
lectively around the world), but it does suggest that at least in a Western context the process of 
individualization has gradually shifted the focus from collectives to individuals. Previously, in 
Bauman’s view, hardships and defeats were suffered collectively, and the responsibility for 
relieving suffering was placed on the strong shoulders of collective charity, social solidarity 
and the welfare state. Now, private insurance schemes and a gradual winding down of the wel-
fare system make the motto ‘every man for himself’ the mantra of our times. In liquid moder-
nity, there are no ‘joining forces’, no ‘us’, no ‘standing arm in arm’, no ‘mutual responsibility’ 
– everything in the last instance falls back upon the increasingly isolated and vulnerable indi-
vidual. As Bauman observes, ‘in our ‘society of individuals’ all the messes into which one can 
get are assumed to be self-made and all the hot water into which one can fall is proclaimed to 
have been boiled by the hapless failures who have fallen into it’ (Bauman, 2001a:9). No sym-
pathy, no solidarity, no shared responsibility, only individual shame, self-recrimination and 
guilt. In a liquid-modern society of apparently ‘self-made’ men and women, there is no more 
any salvation to be expected from society. It is your mess and your problem, so stop blaming 
somebody else or society! Divided we stand, and divided we fall. The fate of the so-called 
‘human waste’ (Bauman, 2004) and of those living in the ‘involuntary ghettos’ (Bauman, 
2001b) is no longer a common concern. 
Moreover, in recent times we have also witnessed the transformation from a society of 
producers to a society of consumers. Nowadays individual identity according to Bauman is 
mainly constructed around the image of the consumer and society simultaneously engages with 
and interpellates its members as consumes (Bauman, 2000a:76, 2007). Obviously, there has 
always been poor people – those unable to earn a living and those outside of the labour market 
forced to live off the ‘benefits’ provided by others. However, in a society of consumers or a 
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consumer society, the losers are now those excluded from consuming. They are not only barred 
from contributing to production and from making a living, but adding insult to injury they are 
also excluded from participation in the game of consumption. They are what Bauman (1998b) 
calls ‘flawed consumers’ and being such a flawed consumer is regarded as one’s own fault – 
due to laziness, lack of effort or simply bad luck: ‘Being excluded is presented as an outcome 
of social suicide, not a social execution’ (Bauman, 2000b:207). In Bauman’s view, in liquid-
modern society primarily two strategies are employed in order to deal with the poor, global as 
well as local, or at least to make their misery unmistakably their own fault. First, the ‘criminal-
ization of poverty’, and second, the ‘brutalization of the poor’. Both strategies consist of polic-
ing and incarcerating the poor, cutting their welfare benefits to a bare minimum, and by pre-
senting their suffering as self-inflicted misfortune. Bauman wonders: ‘Under such conditions, 
one would expect a widespread feeling of injustice, with a potential to condense into a mass 
protest movement, if not an open rebellion against the system. The fact that this does not happen 
testifies perhaps to the effectiveness of the combined strategies of exclusion, criminalization, 
and brutalization of potentially ‘problematic’ strata’ (Bauman, 1997b:235). Consumerism’s 
cutthroat competition, self-blame and mutual estrangement has replaced cooperation, collective 
responsibility and solidarity (with tolerance, as mentioned, squeezing solidarity to the side), 
thus leaving the suffering to their own misfortune. 
As is evident from this condensed extract from some of Bauman’s ‘liquid-modern writ-
ings’, many of the causes of suffering in contemporary society remain blurred, amorphous or 
abstract. Moreover, the human experiences of suffering are often hidden from plain sight – 
tucked away in ghettos, refugee camps or other sites with little or no public interest. It is im-
portant to stress that adiaphorization has thus not disappeared – it was not only part of the 
bureaucracy and technology of solid-modern times. Bauman mentions how adiaphorization to-
day expands primarily through processes of ‘insensitivitization’ via the constant exposure to 
suffering and cruelty on the media and the ‘distanciation’ between the actions of the perpetra-
tors of cruelty and their victims due to technological advances (Bauman, 1995:148-152). In this 
way, a lot of the suffering in liquid modernity remains as invisible and unnoticed as it is rou-
tinely ignored. 
 
Is there a cure for suffering? 
People have suffered throughout thousands of years. But the way suffering is caused and expe-
rienced seems to have changed. In Bauman’s work, suffering is primarily treated as a social 
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phenomenon, although it may be individually experienced. Suffering is a human emotional re-
sponse to different experiences of degradation, harm, pain, maltreatment, marginalization and 
so on. Obviously, the above separation between solid-modern and liquid-modern sources and 
causes of suffering does not really make sense. Only analytically can we claim that some causes 
of suffering are more solid than liquid. Bauman’s shift in orientation towards the processes of 
globalization, individualization and consumerism therefore does not signal that these causes of 
suffering have replaced previous ones, but it is his way of showing – and perhaps today more 
than before – that suffering can also be the outcome of seemingly ‘innocent’ social processes. 
The adiaphorizing engine set in motion in the mass murder of the Jews – aided and abetted by 
modern bureaucracy and technology – is still with us today and is at work in ethnic cleansings 
or war atrocities around the world (think, for example, of the displacement and murder of the 
Rohingya people in Myanmar). It remains a latent source of suffering. But whereas the suffering 
experienced in solid modernity was often associated with state-sponsored violence and brutality 
and totalitarian means of coercion and oppression, in liquid modernity there is often no imme-
diately identifiable perpetrator or culprit of the evil that happens to people, just anonymous 
forces of capitalist deregulation and privatization of every aspect of human life. This apparent 
invisibility of the sources of suffering may mislead us to thinking that the causes of suffering 
almost become amorphous and that there is no responsibility involved. Even though Bauman is 
not searching for someone to blame, he insists that the causes of suffering are social and there-
fore not inevitable or immune to intervention. In Bauman’s work, there is thus no interest in 
natural suffering – a suffering that has its roots in natural conditions of human life. The suffering 
that concerns him is always caused by and is experienced in social circumstances. There is 
nothing natural about inequality, evil or persecution in his work. It is created and perpetuated 
by social arrangements or structural conditions and the outcome is, for example, genocide, un-
employment, poverty, marginalization, deprivation and so on. 
Hence, can something be done to alleviate suffering? Although there is no doubt about 
Bauman’s ambition to annihilate suffering, besides occasionally arguing for ‘basic income’ he 
remains silent when it comes to spelling out specific strategies or policies that may be put to 
use. One might perhaps suspect that the best way to minimize or eliminate social suffering 
would be resorting to social mechanisms and solutions. However, this is not Bauman’s position 
– or at least not the primary one. Bauman’s position – developed throughout several books from 
the early 1990s – is that we cannot meaningfully legislate about morality, and the problem and 
persistence of suffering is fundamentally a moral matter. In his view, even though he acknowl-
edges the importance of strong social and global institutions, the creation and perpetuation of 
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suffering is ultimately a matter of personal responsibility. Morality is a pre-social impulse – it 
does not stem from society but from the moral individual. Morality is, for all practical intents 
and purposes, not suited for legislative initiatives or formalized procedures. As he stated, lean-
ing heavily on the philosophical ideas of Emmanuel Levinas and K. E. Løgstrup: ‘[T]he greater 
the moral responsibility, the dimmer is the hope of its normative regulation’ (Bauman, 
1998c:20, original italics). The truly moral self, in Bauman’s view, is constantly haunted by the 
gnawing suspicion that he/she is not moral enough and that more could have been done to alle-
viate the suffering of others (Bauman, 1993:80). We cannot claim to be moral beings without 
recognizing and embracing – however painful, inconvenient, unrewarding or time-consuming 
– the moral responsibility for the well-being of the sufferers. Morality is not about reason or 
rationality. Our genuine moral commitment cannot be decided on pious desires or idle day-
dreams, but only on our willingness to practice what we preach. If morality remains a matter of 
pure thought or inner conversation, then it will not suffice. The Good Samaritan was good not 
because of what he contemplated doing, but due to what he actually did – intervening in the 
suffering and taking care of the need of an absolute stranger. To turn our backs, to refrain from 
intervening or protesting, amounts to accepting that there are structures and processes in the 
world that perpetuate inhumanity and create suffering. Throughout his work, Bauman insisted 
that we need to orient ourselves to the reality of suffering and to actively pursue the alleviation 
of suffering. As he stated: 
 
The price of silence is paid in the hard currency of human suffering. 
Asking the right questions makes, after all, all the difference between 
fate and destination, drifting and travelling. Questioning the ostensibly 
unquestionable premises of our way of life is arguably the most urgent 
of the services we owe our fellow humans and ourselves (Bauman, 
1998a:5). 
 
Unquestionably, there is something utterly utopian about Bauman’s moral stance (that our in-
dividual moral responsibility will suffice, that we can help everyone, and that we are willing to 
go very far to do so). Bauman was fully aware that we cannot care equally for everybody in the 
world – there are limits to whom we can care for. He thus proposed that there are certain ‘vic-
tims of suffering’ towards whom our concern should particularly be directed – this is the 
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suffering of those who are defenceless and unable to demand our sympathy and solidarity. As 
he once stated about those who most need not only our moral concern but also our moral action:  
 
The children, bodily too weak to resist physical force and mentally too 
inarticulate to oppose, or even ask for, an argument and a proof; the 
animals, devoid of language in which the demand could be phrased and 
of the skills to solicit rights by bargaining or coercion; the yet unborn 
single beings or generations of beings, unable to address us, to recipro-
cate or retaliate, even to appear to us as Faces, as bearers of needs and 
givers of demands; the poor and indolent, the deprived and the dispos-
sessed, denied human rights by the Law, convention or custom, or too 
feeble to execute such rights as have been formally awarded to them … 
These are the cases of moral responsibility reaching its peak (Bauman, 
1998c:20). 
 
These groups – children, generations of the yet unborn, animals, the social outcasts and the 
weak – epitomizes the suffering Other, whose plight we are particularly responsible for reliev-
ing. It is Bauman’s position that the weaker the Other, the more the burden of responsibility 
weighs upon our shoulders. 
Bauman’s understanding of morality (and with it the answer to the problem of suffering) 
is thus mainly in opposition to what might be called the Hobbesian answer to the problem of 
order – that of instituting a moral and social order that pre-empts its members’ freedom of 
choice. Bauman is opposed to an anarchic state of nature (such as the one found in contempo-
rary consumerism) inhabited by the homo lupus – man as a wolf – in which everybody wants 
to have their cake and eat it. Bauman, however, is also opposed to the bureaucratic ethos as 
well as business ethics, any type of organizational contraption that either forces or seduces 
people into acting in ways at odds with their unconditional moral responsibility for the well-
being of others and which results in a ‘free-floating responsibility’ (see, e.g., Kaulingkreks, 
2005). For Bauman, our responsibility is personal. For example, to him it does not matter how 
many people opposed the suffering and killing of the Jews during World War II but that some 
did (Bauman, 1989:207). Solidarity and morality, like suffering, is not a matter of quantity, but 
of quality – of the suffering and the actions taken to prevent it. His answer, no matter how 
unrealistic and unpersuasive it may seem, is thus a ‘morality without ethics’– a human form of 
moral responsibility not regulated by externally enforced rules and societally induced norms 
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(as in a functionalist view of the world), but by an innate sense of responsibility and solidarity. 
Bauman’s moral stance is that of a ‘morality of choice’ rather than a ‘morality of conformity’ 
(Bauman, 1998c) – if morality is forced through, it stops being ‘morality’ and turns into ‘ethics’. 
Bauman is painfully aware that this ‘morality of proximity’, as he also calls it, cannot 
stand alone. He recognizes the almost insurmountable obstacles to the realization of such a 
micro-moral stance in a world ruled by forces of globalization, individualization and consum-
erism (see Bauman, 1997b, 1999b). In times marked by such global challenges, morality more 
than ever before needs the backing of large-scale initiatives and requires more solid levers than 
just individual conscience and responsibility. As he once noted: ‘Morality which always guided 
us and still guide us today has powerful, but short hands. It now needs very, very long hands 
indeed’ (Bauman, 1993:218). Without being coupled with political intervention of a more ex-
tensive reach, such a localized/personalized morality will prove impotent in dealing with and 
suffering on a global scale. As mentioned, in Bauman’s view there is nothing natural or inevi-
table about other people’s suffering – it can be prevented. It requires awareness and willingness 
to act. In our increasingly globalized world, however, these two dimensions are often found 
missing. Politics and power have been separated, and the suffering we witness is often ‘distant 
suffering’ that we find difficult to relate to (Boltanski, 1999). It also means the willingness – 
not least within Bauman’s often academic readership – to nurture an awareness of how suffering 
is a structurally created and maintained phenomenon. 
As should be evident from the above, Bauman’s work is unmistakably moral in that it 
respects the reader and yet calls upon the him/her to respect the text and, also, understand the 
circumstances of her or his own being in the world. In that way, the reader will see that his/her 
own personal situation is intimately linked to wider public issues and, thereby, sociology will 
have engaged in its specific action of enlightenment. Richard Sennett once mentioned this moral 
dimension of Bauman’s work, by saying that Bauman speaks to the present because ‘he sug-
gests that there is a real realm to navigate of personal responsibility, and that makes contact 
with young people … It really appeals when someone tells them that they’re responsible for 
relating to others in an ethical way. That’s why he is so popular’ (Sennett in Bunting, 2003:20). 
 
Conclusion 
This article has presented and discussed the perspective on suffering as developed by Zygmunt 
Bauman throughout his extensive body of work. It has been shown how the theme of suffering 
has continued to constitute an important leitmotif in his concern with understanding the social 
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world. As should be evident from the above, Bauman always sides with those who are suffering, 
no matter whether their suffering is spectacular or invisible, publicly recognized or silenced. 
Bauman’s sociology presents us with a distinctly qualitative look into the diversified world of 
social suffering. His work on suffering – social inequality, violence, mass murder, marginali-
zation and so on – does not rest on statistical refinery or measurements. Although he does at 
times quote some official statistics, most of his ideas on suffering are of a theoretical nature, 
relying primarily on insights from philosophers, social theorists and his own unique analytical 
template. 
We have also seen how the specific focus on suffering has changed throughout his work: 
from a focus specifically on the working-class, then later the Jews to a more generalized per-
spective of the different faces of liquid-modern suffering. It seems as if there has been a change 
from concreteness to abstractness in his treatment of suffering – in its causes and in its experi-
ences. This not least pertains to the increasing invisibility or blurring of the liquid-modern 
causes of suffering. Of course, corporate (or casino) capitalism, neoliberal deregulation and 
consumerism can rightly be blamed (see, e.g. Giroux, 2011), but today it is seemingly far more 
difficult to single out identifiable culprits responsible for the production, proliferation and per-
petuation of suffering than it was with many of the solid-modern predecessors. Bauman’s work 
thus raises the question: Who are the suffering really? Who are these outcasts, strangers, wasted 
lives, human weeds, new poor, the underclass, lives unworthy of life and whatever else Bauman 
throughout his work has called the groups of sufferers? Are they the refugees in the asylum 
centres, the recipients of social benefits, the homeless, the sexually deviant and persecuted, the 
starving in the developing countries, the unemployed, ethnic minorities, or perhaps all of the 
above? For better or for worse, Bauman only rarely (besides in his work on the Jews in the 
concentration camps) specifies the sufferers and they therefore often remain strangely nameless 
and faceless in his work. Moreover, perhaps Bauman even overlooks some sorts of suffering. 
At least according to Ali Rattansi (2017), Bauman throughout his work neglected topics such 
as race, imperialism and gender in his analyses. This also means that Bauman is somewhat blind 
to the suffering related to these specific areas. Moreover, although Bauman’s work is generally 
characterized by a global outlook, many examples from non-Western contexts might in fact 
challenge or even refute some of his claims, e.g. on the importance of processes of individual-
ization or consumerism on contemporary experiences of suffering. 
In his work, Bauman outlined, as we saw, some of the moral implications of the persis-
tence of suffering. In his view, we should all be outraged at the knowledge and sight of suffering 
and spurred into action. However, it is his contention that we have become increasingly blind 
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or immune to the suffering of others in liquid-modern society (Bauman and Donskis 2013). 
Whereas people living in solid-modern society could conjure up excuses that they did not know 
what was going on (e.g. to the Jews in the concentration camps) in order to sooth their con-
science, nowadays such an excuse is as hollow as it is untrue. Most of us – not least due to the 
network of information technologies now available – know about and sometimes even witness 
atrocities as they unfold. We are no longer capable of shrouding our inaction with lack of 
knowledge, innocence and non-complicity. Bauman thus uses his writings as a clarion call to 
his readers to take on their responsibility, and although ‘Bauman’s voice is often friendly … it 
is uncompromising in the demands that it makes upon the reader as reader and as ethical actor’ 
(Beilharz, 2001:3). Bauman demands of his readers that they not only recognize the reality of 
suffering but that they armed with this knowledge will also accept the responsibility that follows 
from this knowledge. Bauman’s sociology is thus a normative endeavour – aimed at pointing 
to the many inequalities, injustices and inhumanities of social life – and asking us to make a 
difference. 
In summary, Zygmunt Bauman in his writings provides us with a sociology of the under-
dog, the outcast, the downtrodden and the sufferers. His sociology, however, is not a defeatist 
declaration that we must passively accept this situation. Suffering is real, and killing it by its 
roots may seem utopian, but Bauman was and remained a utopian of sorts. We can do some-
thing about suffering. Despite this claim, he almost always steered clear of providing concrete 
solutions, prophylaxes or recipes for action (besides his defence for a basic income), the danger 
lurking of closing down options rather than opening reality up to human intervention and trans-
formation. We should therefore always keep our eyes open for the unused possibilities, the 
uncovered terrains, the unchartered territory. Bauman continuously insisted that the world can 
be made into a better – more just, more free, more humane – place, but that it is up to us to 
decide to do something about it and to act upon our conscience and moral responsibility – it 
cannot be legislated or forced through. As Keith Tester once admirably pointed out about Bau-
man’s work: ‘Within his sociology, Bauman tries to show that the world does not have to be 
the way it is and that there is an alternative to what presently seems to be so natural, so obvious, 
so inevitable’ (Tester in Bauman and Tester, 2001:9). Bauman’s sociology is thus an uncom-
promising all-out attack on any assumptions about the world as readymade or unchangeable. 
The suffering in the world cannot simply be wished or analyzed away, it needs to be countered 
and challenged, and sociology plays an important role in this. As Bauman thus stated in his 
inaugural lecture in Leeds in 1972: ‘[E]ither sociology will make sense of the human world, 
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thereby living power to the powerless, or it must admit its own powerlessness to make sense of 
its own existence’ (Bauman, 1972:186). 
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